Historiosophy of law: does everything move or does something stay the same?

The research is devoted to clarifying the subject, sphere of competence and potential of historiosophy in general and historiosophy of law in particular as a cognitive discipline. The signs distinguishing it from philosophy and history are revealed. At the same time, the category of time is revealed, which unites the named objects, being the first and main – an unchangeable and end-to-end – phenomenon of being. The study of time in this capacity made it possible to define “now” and “always” as its main forms of manifestation, within which life takes place, including the life of legal reality. The definition of time as a guiding category of existence has made it possible for legal science to ask a number of meaning-burdening questions. In particular, should I give an answer about how the legislator manages time during rulemaking? Does it include the difference between “time” and “times” in the ranks of legal norms or institutions, does it oblige the law enforcement officer and other consumers of regulatory regulation to take it into account? Does the law instill in them immunity to temporary workers and oprichniks who have acquired legal power? What ultimately translates positive law to its addressees – conjunctural prohibitions dictated by the “rush of time”, or canons that are the standard of behavior “in all ages and times”? According to the results of the study, it is confirmed that the ontological coupling of theory and law belongs to the competence of the historiosophical approach, which is a transcendental questioning. This questioning forms a semantic integrity, in which “always” as an “extrahistorical presence” in history cohabits with “now” as with historical transience in an “extrahistorical dimension”. In relation to the law, this question finds out what is moving in it, and what remains unchanged? When and for what should the law be transformed, and when should it remain unchanged?